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I. Introduction
Given the growing importance of East Asia to global stability and prosperity, 
sustaining the fi ve U.S. treaty alliances in the region—Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines—will remain one of Washington’s 
central foreign policy priorities in the decade ahead. The Bill Clinton and George 
W. Bush administrations and their counterparts have made signifi cant strides 
during the past decade to adapt U.S. alliances with Japan, Australia, and the ROK 
to new circumstances. Sustaining these relationships as mature partnerships will 
require that the allies maintain candid, high-level political dialogues, further 
transform their armed forces, and redouble efforts to sustain domestic support. 
In light of the growing interest of East Asian governments in expanded regional 
cooperation, it will also be important to demonstrate how these alliances provide 
a stable context for and complement multilateral arrangements. Relations with 
Thailand and the Philippines have advanced in recent years on the strength of 
counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping cooperation. Several 
partnerships in Southeast Asia are benefi ting from practical cooperation on 
humanitarian activities and in combating terrorism and other transnational threats 
as well as the growth of democracy in the region.
All these efforts are intertwined with Washington’s handling of several complex 
challenges, including the North Korean nuclear weapons program and potential 
instability on the Korean peninsula, a rising China and cross-strait tension 
between China and Taiwan, the sustenance of regional cooperation in combating 
terrorism, the realignment and transformation of the U.S. military presence 
in the region, Japan’s expanding role in international security affairs, and the 
promotion of peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia.
II. U.S.-Japan Alliance
For close to half a century, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. military presence 
in Japan have served as the foundation for security, stability, and prosperity in 
East Asia. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan 
and the United States commits both countries to maintain and develop their 
capacities to resist armed attack and provide mutual assistance against certain 
attacks, as well as grant the U.S. armed forces access to facilities in Japan “for 
the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 
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international peace and security in the Far East.”1 Forward-deployed forces in 
Japan have allowed the United States to maintain vital economic and strategic 
interests in the region, including security commitments to Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and other Asian allies and friends. About 75 percent of the costs of the U.S. 
military presence in Japan are offset by the Japanese government through direct 
payments and indirect cost-sharing mechanisms.2 For Japan, the alliance offers 
security consistent with its “peace constitution” at reduced costs (less than 1 
percent of gross domestic product [GDP]), extended deterrence against potential 
threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region, and safeguard 
against any future Chinese bid for regional hegemony. Without the alliance, Japan 
would face unattractive choices, including signifi cant expansion of its defense 
capabilities, which could exacerbate regional tensions or trigger a destabilizing 
arms race that would force neighboring countries to choose sides.
At the same time, the alliance is a central pillar of U.S. global strategy and 
complements Tokyo’s 2005 Integrated Security Strategy of fuller international 
engagement to prevent threats from reaching Japan. The U.S. ability to project 
power nearly halfway around the world from Japan was critical to the coalition’s 
success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. A decade later, the deployment of the USS 
Kitty Hawk to the Persian Gulf from Yokosuka, accompanied by Japan Maritime 
Self-Defense Force escort ships in Operation Enduring Freedom, underscored 
the global signifi cance of the U.S. presence in Japan and the mutual benefi ts of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance.
As the Cold War ended, doubts about the viability of and need for the alliance 
surfaced on both sides of the Pacifi c. In Japan, many questioned whether the costs 
of hosting U.S. forces were still warranted in the face of a diminished Soviet 
threat. In the United States, the legacy of bilateral trade and economic disputes 
1. The 1951 security treaty between Japan and the United States provided the initial basis for the 
alliance and allowed for the presence of U.S. armed forces “in and about” Japan “to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against 
armed attack from without.” It was replaced by the 19 January 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security between Japan and the United States, which commits both countries in common to maintain 
and develop their capacities to resist armed attack. It declares that an armed attack on either country 
in territories administered by Japan will be considered dangerous to the safety of the other. However, 
Japan was relieved of any obligation to defend the United States if it were attacked outside of Japanese 
territories because of limitations on its armed forces under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. It 
also grants the U.S. armed forces access to facilities in Japan “for the purpose of contributing to the 
security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” 
2. This fi gure recognizes both direct, on-budget payment of U.S. stationing costs and off-budget 
forgone revenue from taxes, rents, or other charges. Japan provided $3.2 billion in direct cost sharing 
during 2002 (DOD 2004a, table E-5).
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in the 1980s, vocal Japanese opposition to the U.S. military presence, limited 
Japanese support during the 1991 Gulf War, and Tokyo’s cautious response to the 
1994 North Korean nuclear crisis caused many Americans to question Japan’s 
value as an ally (Hwang 2005, 2). In response, the two governments worked 
to update the alliance to meet the challenges of the post–Cold War security 
environment and agreed in April 1996 to the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on 
Security. In September 1997, Japan issued the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation (MOFA 1997) and subsequently enacted legislation that would 
allow Japan to provide the United States with rear-area support in “situations 
in areas surrounding Japan.”
Since 2001, Japan has assumed a greater role in support of international 
stability and security. At the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Japan’s security 
responsibilities extended only 1,000 nautical miles from the home islands. 
Developments since that time include the looming threat of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons and long-range missile programs and the growth of China’s regional 
infl uence and military capabilities. Also, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
challenged traditional assumptions regarding Japan’s security environment, 
stimulated an evolution in thinking about Japan’s security policies, and reaffi rmed 
the strategic importance of the alliance with the United States. Much has been 
accomplished, but more needs to be done to transform the alliance into a global 
strategic partnership.
Convergent Strategic Assessments
The U.S.-Japan alliance has advanced on the basis of convergent assessments 
of the international security environment and a strong mutual conviction that 
the alliance enhances the security of both countries and the Asia-Pacifi c region 
and fosters global peace and stability. These assessments are refl ected in the key 
national security documents of the alliance partners: the U.S. 2001 and 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reports and the 2002 and 2006 National 
Security Strategy reports; and Japan’s 2002 defense white paper, the October 2004 
report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, and the December 
2004 new defense guidelines, as well as various bilateral statements.
Both the 2001 and 2006 QDR reports focused on uncertainty as the defi ning 
feature of the contemporary global security environment—the United States 
could no longer know when, or from what direction, the country or its allies 
might come under attack. Security could be threatened by major war, asymmetric 
attacks by rogue states, the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile delivery 
systems, or acts of international terrorism possibly employing WMD.
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Both QDR reports envisioned Asia as “a region susceptible to large scale military 
competition,” as the Bush administration wrestled with the best course for coping 
with China’s rise. While it did not specifi cally mention China, the 2001 QDR 
(DOD 2001, 4) focused heavily on the requirements of dissuading and deterring a 
possible “military competitor with a formidable resource base” in East Asia. The 
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) advocated cooperative ties with China, 
refl ecting U.S. interest in ensuring Beijing’s support in combating terrorism and 
on other global and regional security issues. The 2002 NSS opened the door 
to closer relations if China demonstrated a commitment to international norms 
and good-neighborly relations, a theme that became a touchstone of U.S. policy 
in 2005 as the administration encouraged China to become a more transparent 
and responsible stakeholder in the international system, while hedging against 
less favorable outcomes (Zoellick 2005; White House 2006, 40–42). Thus, the 
2006 QDR report called for steps to shape the choices of “countries at strategic 
crossroads” (most prominently China) to dissuade a major military competition 
and unveiled the concept of “tailored deterrence” to deal with “near peer 
competitors” and “regional challengers” such as North Korea (DOD 2006a, 
27–31).
Twenty-four Japanese citizens were lost in the attacks on the World Trade 
Center, and Japan had prior experience with domestic terrorism—the 1995 
sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by members of Aum Shinrikyo. 
The Japan Defense Agency’s 2002 white paper declared that the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks “defy not only the U.S., but also the freedom, peace and democracy of 
international society including Japan.” The document noted that certain regional 
disputes, ethnic confl icts, and the proliferation of WMD, particularly possible 
terrorist acquisition of WMD, at a time of growing interdependence “have been 
recognized not merely as domestic issues, but as concerns of the international 
community as a whole.” The white paper highlighted Japan’s obligations to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1363 to cooperate with the international community 
in the suppression of terrorist activity and recognized the leading role the United 
States played in this struggle (JDA 2002, 1–2). Consensus on this assessment 
enabled Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to secure Diet passage in October 
2001—and annual renewal through November 2007—of the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Laws that authorized Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to 
deploy to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to U.S. and coalition 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. When the U.S. secretaries of state and 
defense met with their Japanese counterparts for the fi rst time after 9/11 at the 
December 2002 Security Consultative Committee session, they readily agreed 
to expand cooperation to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, 
mentioning both North Korea and Iraq (DOS 2002).
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Two major reports issued during 2004 refl ected the emerging consensus in Japan 
that the contemporary international security environment required fundamental 
changes in the country’s strategy and defense posture. In March, the Defense 
Policy Subcommittee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) issued 
a report that advocated amending Article 9 of the constitution to refl ect the 
legitimacy of a Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) role in collective self-defense, 
consolidation of crisis decision making in the prime minister’s offi ce, enactment 
of a general law to support international peacekeeping, and enhancement of 
cooperation with the United States on new security threats (LDP 2004). The 
subcommittee report also advocated a major restructuring of the SDF to make it 
more fl exible, and possible development of capabilities to strike enemy missile 
bases in the face of an imminent attack. In October, the Council on Security 
and Defense Capabilities, an advisory body to the prime minister and chaired 
by Hiroshi Araki, issued its report. The “Araki Report” declared that the events 
of 11 September 2001 “marked the beginning of a new century for security 
affairs,” noting the potential threats from both state and nonstate actors. The 
council recommended an “integrated security strategy” for the defense of Japan 
and improving the global security environment, aiming “to prevent a direct threat 
from reaching Japan . . . and to reduce the chances of threats arising in various 
parts of the world with the aim of preventing such threats from reaching Japan 
or affecting the interests of Japanese expatriates and corporations overseas.” 
The strategy envisions use of both hard- and soft-power measures by Japan 
alone, in tandem with the United States, and in cooperation with the rest of 
the international community to improve the security environment and prevent 
the emergence of new threats. The commission report expressed concern with 
China’s rise and the risks to Japanese and global security by a confl ict over 
Taiwan (CSDC 2004, 4–11).
Echoing the 2001 QDR report, Japan’s 2002 white paper noted that 
“unpredictability and uncertainty have persisted” in East Asia as a result the 
diverse national security perspectives of various governments; unsettled regional 
issues, particularly the continuing tension on the Korean peninsula; and the 
presence of enormous military forces, including China’s growing military 
strength. It concluded that the alliance with the United States and presence of 
U.S. forces remained essential to regional peace and stability.
Thus, in the Asia-Pacifi c region, the two governments share a commitment to 
eliminating the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and peaceful 
reunifi cation of the Korean peninsula. While U.S. and Japanese leaders have 
endorsed a cooperative relationship with China, they have also jointly encouraged 
Beijing “to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as 
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globally”; to seek “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait 
through dialogue”; and “to improve transparency of its military affairs.” They 
have also endorsed Russia’s “constructive engagement” in the region and full 
normalization of Japan-Russia relations “through the resolution of the Northern 
Territories issue” and pledged mutual support for “a peaceful, stable and vibrant 
Southeast Asia” (DOS 2005c).
Japan’s Expanding Security Role and the Alliance
A trend toward greater Japanese involvement in international security issues 
has been established during the past few years and will likely continue during 
the coming decade. Given constitutional limitations, however, steps along this 
path have been fi tful and sometimes required special legislation. In December 
2001, the Diet amended the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, which 
set restrictive conditions for deployments and limited involvement to logistical 
support activities, to allow the SDF to undertake a range of core peacekeeping 
missions. The Diet later had to approve special measures so that 600 noncombat 
SDF engineers could support humanitarian and reconstruction operations in 
southern Iraq between February 2004 and July 2006 (PMJ 2003). Prime Minister 
Koizumi overcame domestic skepticism about the Iraq mission by arguing that 
the deployment was essential to bolster stability in the wider Middle East, the 
source of 90 percent of Japan’s oil supplies, and to maintain alliance relations 
with the United States. In addition to support for the United States in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the Koizumi government agreed to acquire and deploy missile defenses, 
participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),3 enhance intelligence 
cooperation, and provide strong diplomatic backing for the U.S. position on 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Crisis management legislation passed 
by the Diet in 2003 and 2004 has further strengthened Tokyo’s crisis response 
authorities and ability to work with the United States in areas surrounding Japan 
(Przystup 2005, 7).
Changing attitudes, particularly among Japanese in their 30s and 40s, toward Japan’s 
international role, possible constitutional revision, and the exercise of the right 
of collective self-defense have underpinned these developments. Japanese public 
support for the alliance with the United States has remained strong during the 
past 40 years but has grown even stronger since 2002, with approval levels at 
3. Japan hosted a PSI exercise in October 2004.
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70 to 80 percent (Gittler 2006).4 Although favorable views of the United States 
in Japan fell in the year after the Iraq War from 74 percent to 68 percent and 
dropped further to 63 percent in 2006 polling, public trust in the U.S. defense 
commitment remains very high (Pew 2006). As for the U.S. military presence, 
a majority of Japanese surveyed in 2004 felt U.S. bases should be reduced—49 
percent “somewhat,” but only 15 percent “greatly”—and 67 percent expressed 
the belief that the bases are important to Japan. Americans also have very positive 
views of Japan and the alliance. While 63 percent of the public had positive views 
of Japan in 2001, 69 percent of the public and 91 percent of opinion leaders 
characterized Japan as a reliable ally (Pew 2006; MOFA 2006).
SDF Transformation
Japan is also moving to transform the SDF to meet emerging security challenges. 
In December 2003, the Koizumi government called for a defense posture review 
to ensure that the SDF is able to respond effectively to the threats of terrorism 
and the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles and to conduct proactive 
activities in support of international peace and stability. In December 2004, the 
government approved the resulting “National Defense Program Guideline for 
FY 2005 and After” (NDPG) and the related “Mid-Term Defense Plan [MTDP] 
FY 2005–2009” (Embassy of Japan 2004a; 2004b). These documents embraced 
the integrated strategy and force posture recommendations of the LDP’s Defense 
Policy Studies Subcommittee and the Araki commission.
The NDPG prescribes a major transformation of the SDF between 2005 and 
2015 from its Cold War posture designed for defense of the homeland against 
full-scale invasion. It envisions a smaller (reduced from 162,000 to 155,000 
personnel), more fl exible, and mobile force with enhanced readiness. The NDPG 
notes the SDF must be able to cope with a diverse range of threats, including low-
intensity attacks in the vicinity of Japan, ballistic missile strikes, terrorist actions, 
airspace intrusions, and attacks by guerrilla or special operations forces against 
offshore islands or critical infrastructure. To enhance the international security 
environment, the NDPG calls for active SDF participation in international peace 
operations and for intensifi ed cooperation with the United States. To deal with the 
threat posed by ballistic missiles as well as more traditional state-based threats in 
areas surrounding Japan, it proposes to pursue ballistic missile defense systems 
and to strengthen the link to U.S. extended deterrence. It called for the 
4. According to a survey conducted in May and June of 2006 sponsored by the U.S. embassy in 
Tokyo, 80 percent of respondents said they favored or strongly favored the alliance. A similar poll in 
2004 found 68 percent of those Japanese surveyed had the same views. The polling sponsored by the 
embassy is supported by a variety of other survey data.
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creation of a Joint Staff offi ce (which was established in April 2006) to improve 
cross-service operational planning, enhanced intelligence collection and analytic 
capabilities, and qualitative improvements to the force through the acquisition of 
technology, particularly information processing and networking capabilities.
Transformation of the SDF’s legacy force structure (which emphasized antitank, 
antisubmarine, and antiaircraft capabilities) and operational practices will take 
time. Budgetary constraints—including a 24.3 trillion yen ($234 billion at 2004 
rates) ceiling set on the total MTDP, with annual budget growth decreasing—and 
the demands placed on social welfare spending by a rapidly aging population 
will limit resources available for transformation and extend its timeline. So, too, 
the 2004 NDPG did not fully address the sensitive issue of whether the SDF 
could be involved in collective self-defense actions, which limits the SDF’s role 
in various regional and global operations. Nonetheless, the course charted by 
the NDPG and the programmatic recommendations of the MTDP will advance 
SDF transformation and enhance alliance relations.
At the 29 October 2005 Security Consultative Committee meeting, the United 
States and Japan reached a sweeping agreement to reshape the alliance in ways 
that refl ect Japan’s willingness to play a larger role in its own defense and 
in regional and global security (DOD 2005). This agreement established the 
framework for closer military ties by calling for more integrated contingency 
planning, collocating some U.S. and Japanese headquarters and units on the same 
bases in Japan, expanding combined military exercises in both countries, and 
enhancing intelligence sharing—all steps designed to strengthen interoperability. 
To enhance combined missile defense activities, Japan agreed to fi nd a site for 
deployment of a U.S. X-band radar, and the United States agreed to deploy 
additional capabilities (Patriot and Aegis) in and around Japan as appropriate.
Key Challenges Ahead
Much has been accomplished in recent years, but the gains are not set in concrete. 
The Shinzo Abe government was seen as likely to maintain the direction set 
by Koizumi. In a historic January 2007 speech to the North Atlantic Council, 
Prime Minister Abe (2007) noted that Japan and NATO share common values 
and responsibilities for dealing with global security challenges. Abe stated 
that Japan would “no longer shy away from carrying out overseas activities 
involving the SDF if it is for the sake of international peace and stability,” and 
he pledged to expand cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Yet this commitment to international engagement was a signifi cant factor in 
Abe’s surprise resignation nine months later, following a diffi cult year in offi ce 
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marked by a series of political scandals and loss of control of the upper house of 
parliament in July by his LDP. Abe cited his inability to break a parliamentary 
deadlock over extension of the antiterrorism legislation that authorized Japan’s 
controversial naval mission in the Indian Ocean as the proximate reason for 
his resignation, and he expressed the hope that his LDP successor could secure 
passage of the measure. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan remains fi rmly 
against the mission, however, and sees it as a wedge issue with which to build 
political momentum and even force early general elections (RFE/RL 2007).
Completion of the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan is 
essential to advancing future bilateral security relations. Enhanced alliance 
cooperation on regional and global security problems will also require further 
strengthening of Japan’s institutional, legal, and military capabilities as well as 
fostering domestic support for this role. The central strategic issues facing Asia 
and Japan—North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Korean unifi cation, and China’s 
emergence as the region’s dominant power—should keep the alliance as a core 
element of Japan’s security strategy. That said, this does not mean that Japan’s 
support for the alliance can be taken for granted. This is particularly the case if 
the United States fails to manage each of these issues—as well the local politics 
of realignment—to an outcome that protects Japan’s security interests. Japan 
wants no part of an Asia dominated by China, but most Japanese also want to 
avoid a confrontation with Beijing.
Realigning the U.S. military presence in Japan. With regard to basing issues, 
Tokyo has focused on Okinawa, where public pressure for a signifi cant reduction 
of U.S. forces has been intense for two decades. Discussions on the overall 
realignment of the U.S. presence in Japan began in 2003, in tandem with the 
internal U.S. Global Posture Review.
Implementation of the 1996 bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa 
(SACO) fi nal report was an area of frustration for more than a decade (MOFA 
1996). The report contained some 28 initiatives to reduce the impact of U.S. 
forces on the residents of Okinawa Prefecture as well as procedural changes 
to the Status of Forces Agreement—all of which have been implemented. The 
heart of the SACO report called for return of approximately 12,000 acres of land, 
contingent on relocation of various facilities within the Okinawa Prefecture. The 
centerpiece land return—the reversion of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 
in a densely populated area of Ginowan city to Japan upon completion of a 
replacement facility elsewhere in Okinawa Prefecture—has been bogged down 
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for years in Tokyo-Okinawa politics.5 Meanwhile, discontent in Okinawa with 
operations at Futenma owing to safety and noise concerns grew, and Tokyo’s 
plans for construction of the replacement airfi eld through a land reclamation 
project across a coral reef met with intense local opposition (Yonetani 2004).
At the end of 2002, the United States and Japan launched the Defense Policy 
Review Initiative (DPRI) to advance alliance transformation, interoperability, 
and force realignment. After protracted and sometimes contentious negotiations, 
DPRI led to agreement on a detailed road map for the realignment of U.S. forces 
in Japan at the 1 May 2006 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (DOS 
2006a; 2006b). Among the issues addressed in the road map are realignment 
on Okinawa, including completion of a Futenma replacement facility in a less-
populated area off Cape Henoko and the relocation of approximately 8,000 
Marine personnel to Guam, land returns and shared use of facilities, improvement 
in U.S. Army command-and-control capabilities, joint use of Yokota airbase, 
relocation of the U.S. Navy carrier airwing from Atsugi to the Marine Corps air 
station at Iwakuni, missile defense, and joint training. The road map commits 
Japan to contribute $6.09 billion in 2008 U.S. dollars toward the estimated $10.27 
billion cost involved in the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Timely completion of these realignment initiatives is essential to alliance 
transformation. This will be a challenge, as public opinion on Okinawa remains 
strongly opposed to the Futenma replacement (Masaki 2006). The political 
leadership in Tokyo needs to make clear to the Japanese public, particularly 
on Okinawa, that realignment and transformation are not simply real estate 
transactions but also involve the enhancement of military capabilities and Japan’s 
assumption of new responsibilities.
Alliance management. Further steps could be taken to strengthen high-level 
dialogue. During its fi rst term, the Bush administration pursued a strategic dialogue 
between the deputy secretary of state and the vice minister of foreign affairs as 
a long-term planning mechanism to review regional and global developments, 
sustain strategic cooperation, and develop a common understanding and strategy 
toward China. In the second Bush term, this has been formally raised to the level 
of secretary of state–foreign minister. In practice, however, the dialogue is now 
managed in the U.S. government by the under secretary of state for political 
5. The SACO report originally envisioned relocation of Futenma to a sea-based facility within eight 
years, but local communities rejected the plan, and the entire project stalled. In 2002, the government 
of Japan and the Okinawa Prefecture reached agreement on a basic plan calling for relocation to a 
dual-use military-civilian landfi ll facility; construction has yet to begin, however, and the government 
of Japan does not envision completion before 2015.
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affairs. Meanwhile, in 2005, the U.S. deputy secretary of state initiated a strategic 
dialogue with China. Although this has raised some concern in Japan that the 
United States is now paying greater attention to China and its economic dynamism, 
it is important to underscore in this context, and elsewhere, that the alliance with 
Japan—and the shared democratic values at its foundation—remains the pillar 
of U.S. regional and global strategy. Given Japan’s increasing role in support of 
international security and the elevation in 2007 of the Japan Defense Agency to 
a cabinet ministry, defense offi cials should be included in the strategic dialogue 
to complement the alliance’s existing “two plus two” structure.6
Missile defense cooperation. North Korea’s continuing development of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems stands as a direct threat to the 
security of Japan and the United States, making missile defense cooperation a 
critical element in advancing security and technology cooperation. In December 
2003, the Koizumi government announced that Japan would acquire and deploy 
missile defense capabilities and continue participation with the United States in 
the development of missile defenses. The government earmarked 106.8 billion 
yen ($929 million) to initiate its missile defense acquisition in the FY 2004 
budget. Spending on missile defense has been one area of steady growth in 
Japan’s defense budget since that time. Driven by concerns about the growing 
threat from North Korea, it reached 182.6 billion yen ($1.5 billion) in FY 2007 
to pay for early deployment of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) 
interceptor missiles and acquisition of Standard 3 missile interceptors for Aegis-
equipped U.S. warships. Defi nition of the full program was a major focus of 
the NDPG and MTDP. The target date for the initial deployment of the missile 
defense system is 2008, and the system is scheduled to be fully operational in 
2011.
The missile defense decision marks a signifi cant step forward in Japan-U.S. 
defense cooperation and integration, and it is complemented by the purchase of 
Aegis destroyers, licensed production of the PAC-3 missile, and joint research and 
development on advanced interceptors. Both governments have reaffi rmed their 
commitment to missile defense cooperation, which allows both countries to hedge 
against the long-term challenge posed by China’s continuing military buildup 
and modernization of its missile force. Greater cooperation in missile defense 
R&D and production would be facilitated by a decision to alter the Japanese 
6. The Araki Report (CSDC 2004, 14) also wisely recommended that U.S.-Japan cooperation in 
dealing with new transnational security threats and in the areas around Japan utilize the comprehensive 
mechanism under the security guidelines to integrate the efforts of a wide array of military, civil, and 
police agencies. The Japan Defense Agency became the Japan Defense Ministry on 9 January 2007.
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government’s arms export control policy. At the same time, the development 
and deployment of an operative missile defense system should not come at the
cost of other elements of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, such as host nation 
support payments or SDF modernization.
Institutional development. To become a fuller partner in the alliance and the 
management of international peace and security, the Japanese government needs 
to continue to develop its national security institutions, military capabilities, and 
interoperability with U.S. forces. An important step in this process is the effort 
since April 2006 to enhance joint planning among the SDF branches. Combined 
planning with the United States concerning threats to Japan and contingencies in 
areas surrounding Japan should also be undertaken at the appropriate command 
levels, and the creation of a new U.S.-Japan Joint Task Force Headquarters at 
Camp Zama in 2008 should facilitate this (Halloran 2006).
Additional steps could be taken to improve intelligence sharing and crisis 
coordination. Japan has created a National Security Council, but its capabilities 
for crisis management and policy development at the subcabinet level need 
to be further developed. Japan also needs a government-wide legal system to 
protect classifi ed information from unauthorized release. All these measures 
would improve U.S.-Japan crisis management. Finally, the Japanese Diet should 
pass permanent, generic laws establishing generic principles to facilitate timely 
Japanese participation in international peace operations rather than rely on special 
legislation to authorize each engagement.
Sustaining Japanese political support for the alliance. Although Japan’s 
leaders seem open to increasing involvement in global security issues and 
have concerns about threats from North Korea and China, its citizens remain 
decidedly pacifi st and uncertain about military engagement. Unlike in South 
Korea, the U.S. global posture review and its call for greater fl exibility in the 
use of stationed forces was not controversial in Japan because those forces have 
regularly undertaken off-island operations, and the Japanese are more wary of 
China. Although Tokyo seems generally satisfi ed with the current consultation 
arrangements with respect to operations by U.S. forces in Japan, differences 
could still arise over controversial U.S. military actions supported by forces 
based in Japan. Political leaders in both countries could do more to emphasize 
to their constituents how the alliance and the U.S.-Japan strategic partnership 
support convergent interests in supporting democracy, prosperity, and stability 
in the Asia-Pacifi c region and around the globe.
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III. The U.S.-ROK Alliance
The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea still enjoys 
strong support in both countries but is facing its most complex set of challenges 
since the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 was signed. Bilateral efforts to 
transform the alliance into a fuller, more equal partnership and articulate a 
common vision of its future course are taking place within the context of a 
complicated and paradoxical security environment marked by lingering North-
South military confrontation, but with a diminished sense of threat in the ROK; 
fi tful negotiations to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, as the 
South’s economic engagement in the North deepened; ROK involvement in 
the global war on terrorism, but divided opinion over engagement of its forces 
in Iraq; and strong support for the alliance and the U.S. military presence, 
coupled with fears that these ties could draw South Korea into a confrontation 
with China. Seoul and Washington have differing perspectives on the main 
threats to security in Northeast Asia and on the role of the alliance in regional 
and global contingencies. On a divided peninsula, the ROK is itself marked 
by deep political and generational cleavages on a range of issues, including 
attitudes toward the United States and policy toward North Korea. For the fi rst 
50 years of the alliance, the North Korean threat loomed so large that U.S.-ROK 
differences were generally sublimated in the interest of unity. The strengthening 
of democracy in Korea, the development of a genuine opposition party, and the 
emergence of a lively debate on foreign and national security issues in Korea 
have also made alliance politics more volatile.
Shifting Attitudes in South Korea
Anti-U.S. sentiment in some segments of the South Korean population has 
strained alliance relations. As memories of U.S. assistance in the Korean War 
and postwar reconstruction fade, frictions related to the ROK’s continuing 
dependence on the United States for its security, and the sizable military 
presence associated with it, have become magnifi ed. This dependence, coupled 
with Korea’s history of being subject to colonial rule during the fi rst half of the 
twentieth century, has left many Koreans with a deep sense of frustration over 
their inability to control their destiny (Hong 2005). Some segments of South 
Korean society feel that Washington has handled problems in the relationship, 
including certain incidents related to U.S. military operations in Korea and 
economic disputes, in an arrogant fashion.7 The strident student protests and 
7. For a discussion of the underlying sources of Korean attitudes toward the United States, see 
Steinberg (2003).
17149_043--074.indd   56 3/16/2009   4:08:31 PM
                 Shifting Strategic and Political Relations with the Koreas        57
more nuanced anti-U.S. sentiment voiced by some mainstream South Korean 
politicians in recent years do not pose a near-term threat to the alliance—more 
than 70 percent of the population favors maintaining or strengthening the 
relationship, and about 80 percent feel the U.S. military presence is important to 
South Korea’s security. If the current polarization of South Korean attitudes toward 
the United States and North Korea along political and generational lines persists, 
however, it could erode the fabric of the alliance (Lee and Jeong 2004, 30).
A good part of the shift in attitudes toward the United States can be traced to 
the coming to political power of the “386 generation”: people now in their 30s 
and 40s and who were born in the 1960s and educated during the period of 
protests for democratization in the 1980s. Two-thirds of South Koreans are now 
under age 40. The 386 generation is generally more nationalistic, outspoken, 
and questioning of U.S. intentions than their parents. The 386 generation was 
prominent in the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun, who supported the 
young democratic activists in the 1980s, and in the leadership of the progressive 
(center-left) Uri Party, which backed Roh Moo-hyun and held a large majority 
in the National Assembly. The 386 generation has no fi rsthand memory of the 
Korean War, but members of that generation did witness past U.S. support 
for authoritarian ROK governments and what they perceive as enduring U.S. 
unilateralism and lack of consultation in handling previous security crises on 
the peninsula. A number of intellectuals of this generation hold the view that 
U.S. policies facilitated Japanese hegemony over Korea between 1905 and 1945 
and favored Japan over Korea after World War II. Some even believe that U.S. 
conduct of the Korean War led to the country’s partition.8 These perspectives 
have also been infl uenced by leftist teachers in secondary and higher education 
and inaccurate, polemical information on the Internet.
Developments since 2001, including the Bush administration’s tough stance 
toward Pyongyang and skepticism of the ROK’s Sunshine Policy of engagement 
with the North, coupled with the accidental killing in 2002 of two Korean 
schoolgirls by U.S. soldiers who were subsequently acquitted of any wrongdoing, 
led to sharp drops in popular opinion about the United States. In U.S. State 
Department–sponsored surveys, South Koreans expressing favorable views of 
the United States declined from 66 percent in July 2001 to 47 percent in January 
2003, and 59 percent felt bilateral relations were poor—the lowest reading in 15 
years (DOS 2003, 1–2). Overall attitudes toward the United States and bilateral 
relations have improved somewhat since 2005 but are more evenly divided than 
8. For an incisive discussion of anti-Americanism in Korea and concerns of the 386 generation, see 
Park K. (2005, 22–24).
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before 2001 (M-15-06).9 The generational differences are refl ected in 2005 survey 
data showing that, while 69 percent of those 50 and older held favorable views 
of the United States, opinion among those in their 30s (51 percent favorable, and 
48 percent unfavorable) and 20s (52 percent favorable, 45 percent unfavorable) 
was more evenly split (DOS 2005a). As concerns about the North Korean 
nuclear threat, reductions of U.S. forces in Korea, and the attendant potential of 
an economic downturn have grown, attitudes of younger Koreans, particularly 
those in their 20s, have become more positive toward the United States and the 
alliance (Lee and Jeong 2004, 34–35).
The military accident in 2002 led to near-unanimous support for revision of the 
Status of Forces Agreement, which was seen as institutionalizing the ROK’s 
subordinate role in the alliance. Nonetheless, support for the U.S.-ROK alliance 
remains strong, particularly among older Koreans and members of the opposition 
Grand National Party. In 2005 and 2006 polling, large majorities continued to 
express support for the alliance, and about 80 percent believed the U.S. military 
presence is needed for Korea’s security. More than 70 percent see the United 
States as the most benefi cial security partner for Korea during the coming decade, 
and 69 percent believe the alliance should be maintained after unifi cation. The 
intensity of support for the U.S. military presence has diminished signifi cantly 
since 2000 (in 2005, however, 26 percent of those surveyed said it is very 
important, down from about 40 percent in the late 1990s).
South Korean views on North Korea are also divided—43 percent positive and 
52 negative in early 2005—but this is a signifi cant shift since 2001, when 73 
percent viewed the North unfavorably (Lee and Jeong 2004, 3). Most South 
Koreans are not worried about a North Korean attack. They are concerned about 
the North Korean nuclear program and the possible collapse of the North, with 
the attendant potential for instability and economic dislocation throughout the 
peninsula. In 2005, 80 percent of South Koreans supported efforts to engage 
North Korea through the development of economic and cultural relations.10 That 
same year, a majority of South Koreans (59 percent) believed that Pyongyang 
9. Lee and Jeong (2004) note that several independent South Korean surveys showed a rise in 
support for a stronger alliance in 2003 and 2004.
10. In a May 2005 poll, only 13 percent of South Koreans surveyed saw North Korea as a threat to 
regional peace and stability. Ranking their security concerns about North Korea, 41 percent cited 
the North’s nuclear weapons program, 30 percent the collapse of the North and a massive refugee 
fl ow, and only 5 percent worried about the prospect of North Korea supplying terrorists with WMD. 
Only 29 percent feel the North’s nuclear program poses an immediate threat to South Korea’s 
security, and 25 percent believe it poses no direct security threat but worry it could limit foreign 
investment (DOS 2005b, 1).
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would surrender its nuclear program for a package of political and economic 
benefi ts. Although there is broad support for U.S. and international efforts in the 
six-party talks to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear programs, most South Koreans 
favor an incremental approach featuring both incentives and punishments. In a 
2004 survey, 27 percent of South Koreans blamed the United States for the lack 
of progress in the talks, and 70 percent lacked confi dence that the United States 
would protect South Korea’s interests in negotiations with the North. South 
Korean attitudes toward the North have hardened, however, and the Sunshine 
Policy has been tempered in the aftermath of Pyongyang’s 9 October 2006 
nuclear test (Cho and Sim 2006).
A troubling trend is the surge in anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea. In 
early 2005, 80 percent of South Koreans had unfavorable views of Japan, and 
90 percent felt relations with Japan were poor. South Koreans see Japan (29 
percent), as well as North Korea (13 percent) and China (12 percent), as potential 
threats to regional peace and stability during the coming decade or more.11 This 
sentiment is rooted in resentment over issues of history, the legacy of Japan’s 
wartime occupation of Korea, as well as the reemergence of long-standing 
territorial controversies. Particularly among elites, however, there is a fear that 
growing U.S.-backed Japanese involvement in management of regional and 
international security affairs could revive Japanese militarism and ambitions 
for regional hegemony. So, too, South Korean leaders and the wider population 
fear that what is perceived as Washington’s strategic tilt toward Japan will make 
their country both less secure and less important to the United States.
Attitudes toward China, which has been the ROK’s top export market since 
2003, have fl uctuated but refl ect an abiding wariness. Beijing is now widely 
seen as a constructive partner in managing the North Korean nuclear problem 
and other aspects of regional security affairs. In a 2004 poll, South Koreans 
expressed equally positive feelings (58 percent) toward China and the United 
States (CCFR 2004, 16). However, South Koreans also express lingering 
concerns about China’s authoritarian political system and suspicions about its 
motives in Northeast Asia. The South Korean public and political leadership 
are well aware of China’s history of domination of their country and know 
that China’s rising economic and military power could at some point be used 
against Korean interests. In survey reported by Dong-a Ilbo on 4 May 2004, 61 
percent of respondents noted that China was the most important country from an 
economic standpoint, but 51 percent also saw China as a “competitive rival,” and 
11. In 2005, the numbers were Japan 29 percent, North Korea 13 percent, and China 12 percent. In 
2006, the fi gures were Japan 17 percent, North Korea 14 percent, and China 14 percent.
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78 percent said China’s products would surpass Korean goods in 10 years. The 
Korean public’s perception of China as an economic and political rival has grown 
since 2005, particularly as China has stirred historical territorial disputes.
Figure 1: Shifting South Korean Attitudes
U.S. Goals and Strategy: North Korea
Dealing with the DPRK’s nuclear program has also complicated alliance 
management issues with the ROK. The Bush administration has steadfastly 
defined North Korea’s nuclear programs as a challenge to security in 
Northeast Asia and to international efforts to stem WMD proliferation, not as 
a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. Since early 2003, 
the administration has emphasized that multilateral negotiations are the best 
way to resolve the problem, and, with Chinese assistance, the six-party talks 
commenced in August 2003. The administration’s diplomacy has succeeded in 
getting China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia to agree on the need for complete, 
verifi able, and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK nuclear programs, which 
has helped to minimize, though not eliminate, North Korean efforts to create 
fi ssures within this coalition. Multilateral coordination has been hampered by 
differing interests and Pyongyang’s efforts to play to South Korean sympathies 
and Chinese anxieties.
Given these challenges, progress in the six-party talks has been limited and 
marked by several lengthy boycotts by the DPRK. At the end of the fourth 
round of talks on 19 September 2005, the six parties produced a joint statement 
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of principles to guide negotiations. The statement was immediately subject 
to differing interpretations, particularly by the DPRK. However, the U.S. 
government made clear its view of the main tenets, which were generally 
endorsed by all the other parties: all nuclear weapons and all elements of the 
DPRK’s nuclear programs will be declared and completely, verifi ably, and 
irreversibly dismantled; the DPRK will return, at an early date, to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and come into full compliance with International 
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and various benefi ts, particularly the right 
to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes at the “appropriate time,” will 
accrue to the DPRK only when it has met these two obligations, demonstrated a 
sustained commitment to cooperation and transparency, and ceased proliferating 
nuclear technology (Hill 2005). The ROK government has been inclined to offer 
generous incentives to the North—including provision of energy and nuclear 
power early in the process—as a way to induce cooperation on the nuclear issue 
and to advance North-South reconciliation. Transforming the joint statement 
and the February 2007 initial action agreement on shutting down the Yongbyon 
reactor into an agreement acceptable to all six governments and the U.S. Congress 
will require a protracted and arduous diplomatic effort.
In addition to the nuclear issue, there remain differences between the United 
States and South Korea over policy toward Pyongyang; differences include 
assistance, investment, and dealing with the regime’s illicit activities. The ROK 
government rightly wants to play the leading role in managing relations with the 
North, including contingencies related to internal collapse. Both governments, 
however, recognize that the United States has unique experience and capabilities 
to fi nd and secure the DPRK nuclear program in such a scenario. The two 
governments will need to continue to discuss integration of various crisis 
management plans and harmonization of these plans with combined operational 
military plans for the defense of South Korea. Although the ROK has endorsed 
the principles of the PSI, it has yet to become a participant because of fears that 
engagement in certain PSI counterproliferation activities could have an adverse 
effect on relations with the North. U.S. and Japanese participation in any future 
PSI activities directed against North Korea would raise anxieties in the ROK 
government about various forms of North Korean retaliation against the South.
Rebalancing the Military Relationship
The two governments have agreed to the goal of a South Korean–led defense of the 
peninsula with the United States in a supporting role, but differences remain about 
the timing and ultimate structure of the new arrangements. Bilateral discussions 
on the future of the alliance (FOTA) between 2002 and 2004 focused on legacy 
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issues including adjusting the U.S. footprint, transfer of certain conventional 
defense missions from U.S. to ROK forces, and enhancing combined defenses. 
In particular, the FOTA talks produced plans to shift U.S. forces deployed 
close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to consolidated bases south of Seoul 
and for transfer of the Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul and 59 other facilities 
to South Korean control. In tandem with the realignment, the ROK pledged to 
invest $10 billion to modernize its capabilities, and the United States committed 
to enhancements in fi repower, air, and naval support valued at $11 billion and 
to maintain deterrence and support this evolving posture (Lawless 2006).12
In June 2004, before either the Global Posture Review or the FOTA talks 
were completed, the U.S. Department of Defense notifi ed the South Korean 
government of plans to withdraw 12,500 troops (about one-third of total 
deployments) from the peninsula by the end of 2005. This move followed a 
May 2004 decision to redeploy one of two U.S. combat brigades (3,600 troops) 
in the ROK to Iraq and sometimes contentious FOTA discussions.
These developments surprised most Koreans and brought to the fore their 
confl icted feelings between the desire for and costs of a more self-reliant defense 
posture and the compromises attendant to continued reliance on the U.S. security 
guarantee. Korean offi cials worried about the ROK’s ability to take on larger 
military missions and were concerned that the redeployments would mean that 
U.S. forces would no longer serve as the trip wire in mutual defense operations, 
leaving South Korea less rather than more secure. After several months of 
bilateral consultations, the governments agreed in October 2004 that the U.S. 
withdrawals and realignment would be stretched out through 2008 and plans to 
remove one artillery and one attack helicopter battalion would be cancelled.13 The 
residual U.S. presence of 25,000 military personnel will be clustered around two 
12. Under this plan, the Second Infantry Division, the main U.S. ground combat force in the ROK, 
and Eighth Army Headquarters would relocate to consolidated bases in the Osan-Pyongtaek region. 
Some of these adjustments had been under consideration since the early 1990s under the East Asian 
Strategy Initiative (EASI), an effort of the fi rst Bush administration to develop a comprehensive 
vision of the alliance for the long term following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in 
East Asian security at that time. EASI included a 10-year plan to reduce U.S. troops from 135,000 to 
about 98,000 by the end of 1995. The EASI also called for redefi nition of U.S. alliances in the region.
13. During the fi rst phase in 2004, 5,000 troops, including the Second Brigade Combat Team of 
the Second Infantry Division and associated units, were withdrawn (after a year in Iraq, the Second 
Brigade redeployed to Fort Carson, Colorado, in 2005). During the second phase, 2005–06, the 
United States redeployed another 5,000 troops (3,000 in 2005, 2,000 in 2006), comprising combat 
units, combat support and combat service support units, units associated with mission transfer 
areas, and other support personnel. In the third and fi nal phase, 2007–08, the United States were 
scheduled to redeploy 2,500 troops consisting primarily of support units and personnel (DOD 2004b).
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hubs in the Osan-Pyongtaek and the Taegu-Pusan areas; however, the conditions 
for transfer of existing U.S. facilities and the acquisition of additional land for 
the consolidated bases by 2011 under the Land Partnership Plan, while agreed 
by both governments, remain contentious political issues in South Korea on 
environmental and legal grounds.
Greater self-reliance in defense has been a goal of South Korean governments 
since the 1970s. Investment of more than $65 billion in several force improvement 
plans since that time has signifi cantly enhanced the readiness and capabilities of 
the ROK Army but did not fundamentally reduce the country’s dependence on 
the United States. President Roh came to offi ce in 2003 determined to reduce this 
dependency, consistent with South Korea’s current prosperity and international 
stature, and to make the alliance a more balanced partnership. Roh advanced the 
concept of “cooperative, self-reliant defense” as a means for the South Korean 
government to realize greater control over its defense plans and decision making 
and to reassure the public that, with improved capabilities, the ROK armed 
forces could provide for national defense even after the planned reduction and 
realignment of U.S. forces. President Roh and his advisers explained that that 
the term “cooperative” underscored the intent to both maintain a transformed 
alliance with the United States and develop regional security cooperation in 
Northeast Asia (Roh 2003a, 2003b; Hoon 2005).
While ROK defense budgets have grown significantly in recent years, 
maintenance and personnel costs absorbed 66 percent of the 2004 and 2005 
budgets, leaving only about 34 percent for required force improvements.14 In an 
effort to achieve a self-reliant posture, the Korean Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) unveiled “Defense Reform 2020,” a plan for qualitative transformation 
of the ROK defense establishment during a period of 15 years. The 2020 plan 
calls for reducing standing forces by 26 percent but enhancing the capabilities 
of residual units through better joint planning and acquisition of state-of-the-
art weapons and support systems. Force structure would be streamlined and 
include more professionals and fewer conscripts. Modernization would focus on 
improved mobility, situational awareness, and precision strike capabilities. The 
MND hopes to replace nearly every outdated major weapons platform; upgrade 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems; 
and purchase new air defense missiles and Aegis-equipped destroyers. To 
ensure effective oversight of expenditures, a new Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration will be established.
14. The ROK defense budget increased by 9.9 percent ($20.08 billion) in 2005 and 10 percent ($22.9 
billion) in 2006 (Park J. 2005).
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The 2020 plan calls for expenditure of $662 billion between 2006 and 2020, 
with 43 percent of those resources to be earmarked for force improvements. 
To sustain this program, the MND estimates that defense spending would need 
to increase 9.9 percent annually from 2006 to 2010, 7.8 percent from 2011 to 
2015, but only 1 percent from 2016 to 2020.15 Under the ROK government’s 
projections of 7 percent average annual GDP growth over the life of the reform 
program, the MND estimates that the program would consume 2.6 to 3 percent 
of GDP until 2010, after which time the burden would decrease.
Realization of Defense Reform 2020 will be a challenge for any South Korean 
government. Since the plan was issued, the Bank of Korea has projected lower 
out-year growth rates, and the potential for an economic downturn always 
exists. Pressures to control overall governmental expenditures and a general 
public skepticism about defense spending will likely remain impediments, 
absent a spike in concerns about North Korea. During the fi rst half of the 2020 
plan implementation, expenditures associated with the relocation of U.S. forces 
and the assumption of additional missions by ROK forces will likely raise 
MND operations and maintenance costs. Some analysts have questioned both 
the savings that can be achieved by cutting army personnel so steeply and the 
wisdom of taking such cuts before demographic trends require them, given the 
manpower-intensive demands of possible stabilization missions in the event of a 
North Korean collapse (Bennett 2006, 21–23, 37–39). Several analysts (Bennett 
2006, 23–26; Han 2006, 127) assess that a truly independent ROK defense 
capability would require even greater defense spending.16
President Roh and his advisers also made transfer of wartime operational 
command (OPCON) of ROK forces a touchstone of alliance transformation. 
In 2005, Roh began a public campaign for transfer of wartime OPCON of 
ROK forces, calling it a matter of regaining sovereignty and a valuable step in 
diminishing North-South tensions. Chosun Ilbo on 2 October 2005 reported that 
President Roh argued that projected improvements in ROK defense capabilities 
would allow the transfer.
The United States supports the goal of Koreans playing a predominant role in 
their own conventional defense, including a change in command relationships. 
Washington’s assessment is that ROK forces are capable of defending South 
15. The 2020 plan calls for 9.9 percent annual growth in defense spending 2006–10, 7.8 percent 
2011–15, and 1.0 percent 2016–20 (MND 2005; Han 2006, 116–17).
16. The MND’s original 2020 plan was $725.55 billion and called for 11 percent growth in defense 
spending in 2006–10.
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Korea, with certain U.S. support. U.S. offi cials accepted the move from shared 
operational control under a combined headquarters to a system of independent, 
parallel national commands as a natural next step in the evolution of the 
alliance and suggested that this could take place as early as 2009. This kicked 
off a fi restorm of protests in Korea from former defense offi cials through the 
opposition parties that saw an OPCON shift by that date as premature and ill-
advised, urging that further debate on timing be suspended until a new ROK 
government takes offi ce in 2008. At the 38th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative 
Meeting, the ROK defense minister and the then U.S. defense secretary, Donald 
Rumsfeld, reviewed the results of a command relations study commissioned a 
year earlier and agreed to a road map that would transfer OPCON to the ROK 
after 15 October 2009 but not later than 15 March 2012 (DOD 2006b). In 
February 2007, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Defense Minister Kim 
Jang-soo concluded an agreement that fi rmly established the transfer date as 17 
April 2012. The two governments have agreed to develop a strategic transfer plan. 
U.S. offi cials have underscored that the new command structure will maintain 
deterrence and combined U.S.-ROK defense of the Korean peninsula and that 
the United States will provide signifi cant “bridging capabilities”—such as the 
CFC command-and-control system—until the ROK achieves a fully independent 
defense capability. Sorting out a transitional command structure and long-term 
crisis management arrangements on the peninsula will require transparency, good 
faith, and fl exibility by both governments as well as candid discussions about 
handling sensitive issues relating to instability in North Korea.
Shaping a Broader Vision of the Alliance
U.S. and South Korean leaders have recognized that their mutual regional and 
global security interests, as well as a potential North-South rapprochement, 
require the development of a broader, long-term vision for the alliance—one 
that expands its function from its present narrow peninsular focus (White House 
2003). Most ROK political leaders across the political spectrum believe their 
country’s security and prosperity are still somewhat fragile and that the alliance 
with the United States remains an important safeguard against instability on the 
peninsula and a balancing factor in relations with China and Japan. A majority 
of South Koreans also see shared democratic values and deep economic and 
personal ties as important underpinnings of the alliance. In contrast with Japan, 
however, the notion of the alliance serving purposes other than defense of the 
ROK is a relatively new concept in South Korean political discourse. President 
Roh, for example, justifi ed the unpopular deployment of 3,500 ROK military 
personnel in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as a necessary manifestation 
of alliance solidarity and good faith, not a Korean contribution to protection of 
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its own interests in Persian Gulf stability and energy supplies. Moreover, many 
on the left who object to the U.S. military presence are also skeptical of the 
benefi ts of the alliance for advancing South Korean interests. Without a shared 
vision of the future, both governments will have great diffi culty making the case 
for the alliance to their publics.
Following the Future of the Alliance initiative, in late 2004 Washington and 
Seoul began the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), an interagency dialogue aimed at 
implementing agreements reached in the FOTA talks and developing a long-term 
vision of the alliance. The SPI reached a broad consensus on the main global and 
regional security challenges and produced agreement on a “Joint Study on the 
Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance” that describes how the alliance can contribute 
to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, in the region, and globally (DOD 
2006b, para. 8). Going forward, SPI will focus on articulating a vision for the 
future development of the alliance and a concept for operationalizing that vision, 
including the roles of each partner in fulfi lling these objectives.
At the November 2005 Gyeongju summit, President Bush and President Roh 
agreed to launch a ministerial-level Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership 
(SCAP) to promote dialogue on bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual 
interest. The two presidents noted that the alliance not only stands against threats 
but also for the promotion of the common values and interests in Asia and around 
the world (White House 2005). At the fi rst session of SCAP in January 2006, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon set out 
an agenda for practical cooperation to promote democracy and human rights; 
to counter terrorism and proliferation of WMD; to prevent pandemic disease; 
to enhance regional stability; and to bolster multilateral peacekeeping, crisis 
response, and disaster management. The consultations will be followed by a 
subministerial dialogue.
A particularly contentious element of alliance transformation concerns strategic 
fl exibility, a reference to off-peninsula operations by U.S. forces deploying 
from bases in Korea. Both the Korean government and the broader public are 
concerned that U.S. operations from the ROK could draw the country into 
regional confl icts, particularly a confrontation with China over Taiwan, and that 
the global missions of U.S. forces might diminish their deterrent value on the 
peninsula. U.S. offi cials have sought to allay South Korean concerns on both 
accounts, noting that the concept is a two-way street that would also facilitate 
rapid movement of U.S. forces stationed elsewhere to the Korean peninsula in 
a crisis. President Roh acknowledged the logic behind strategic fl exibility but 
also affi rmed that “USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] should not be involved in disputes 
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in Northeast Asia without Korea’s agreement. . . . We will never compromise 
on this” (Min 2005). At the January 2006 SCAP meeting, Secretary Rice and 
Foreign Minister Ban issued a declaration formally acknowledging respect for 
the other’s position.17 Some South Korean analysts and politicians contend that 
this agreement requires amendment of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and hence 
approval by the National Assembly. In addition, the South Korean government 
would clearly like prior consultation on off-peninsula operations by units 
assigned to USFK, which could limit U.S. fl exibility.
Another question on the horizon is clarifying how the alliance could complement 
any future Northeast Asian regional security cooperation or structure. Some in 
the ROK hope the six-party talks can evolve into such a permanent forum for 
dealing with regional security issues, while others envision structures limited to 
countries in the region. President Roh in a speech in Hong Kong on 11 May 2005 
emphasized that his concept of “cooperative, self-reliant defense” would also 
allow for South Korea to act as a peaceful “balancing force” in a “cooperative 
security structure in the region based on the Korea-U.S. alliance” (Shim 2005). 
This statement was quickly clarifi ed by Blue House advisers as not suggesting 
any notion of South Korea balancing China and the United States. However, 
Roh continued to send mixed signals. Rather than endorse the notion that an 
adapted alliance with the United States could play a stabilizing role in Northeast 
Asia, Roh chose to advance more independent notions, warning of the need to 
“overcome old divisions” in the region. Roh and most South Koreans clearly 
feared aligning their country with the United States and Japan in any future 
effort to contain China (Ser 2005).
Sustaining the U.S.-ROK Alliance
In light of changing political and geostrategic landscapes, sustaining the U.S.-
ROK alliance will require concerted bilateral efforts to continue transforming 
the relationship. Several efforts are essential to this goal.
Six-party talks and North Korea. Resolute but creative diplomacy in the 
six-party talks remains essential to a durable resolution of the North Korean 
17. At the January 2006 SCAP meeting, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Ban issued a declaration 
that the ROK “respects the necessity for strategic fl exibility,” while the United States pledged that 
in implementing strategic fl exibility, it “respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a 
regional confl ict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people” (DOS 2006c; Min 2005). 
Chinese offi cials have played into this debate in the ROK; the Korea Times reported on 22 March 2006 
that, according to the ambassador of China to the ROK, China accepts the presence of U.S. forces in 
the ROK for bilateral security, but those forces should never be directed at a “third party.”
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nuclear challenge, maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and 
further adaptation of U.S. alliances with the ROK and Japan. It is essential for 
the United States and other governments to demonstrate that every effort has 
been made to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully. Unilateral or coercive actions 
may ultimately be necessary but could well come at the cost of public support 
for the alliance in the ROK. The key challenge for U.S. diplomacy will be to 
demonstrate a forthcoming public face and tactical fl exibility while remaining 
fi rm on strategic outcomes. In the aftermath of Pyongyang’s October 2006 nuclear 
test, Washington has reassured Seoul that its long-standing pledge of extended 
deterrence through the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains in effect. U.S. and South 
Korean leaders also need to initiate a more candid and transparent dialogue about 
North Korea, leading to more coordinated policies. Otherwise, differences on 
this issue will continue to hamper adaptation of the alliance.
Shaping a fuller and broader partnership. The bilateral defense and foreign 
ministry dialogues are moving to adapt the alliance and develop a common 
vision to advance mutual interests. The U.S.-ROK Security Policy Initiative 
has produced agreement on a common vision of the alliance, but further efforts 
on the part of both governments are required to broaden and deepen political 
support for a transformed alliance. If reshaped as an equal partnership between 
two democracies committed to defending shared values and common interests, 
the alliance could weather most developments in North-South relations or the 
region. Rather than being organized against a specifi c threat, it would serve a 
number of common Korean-U.S. interests, including maintaining stability on 
the peninsula in the context of either a DPRK collapse or peaceful reunifi cation; 
working with other Asian countries and institutions to enhance regional security 
cooperation; supporting international (UN) and other regional (Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, NATO) efforts to stabilize failed states, combat 
terrorism, and slow WMD proliferation; and hedging against the emergence of 
an aggressive China. Such a vision of the U.S.-ROK alliance could engender 
the requisite political support on both sides of the Pacifi c. Indeed, it refl ects the 
calls in South Korea for transforming the relationship into “a comprehensive, 
dynamic, and future-oriented alliance.” This kind of a mature partnership with 
the United States would allow South Korea to extend its global infl uence.
Defense transformation and strategic fl exibility. A transformed alliance should 
refl ect the ROK’s desire to achieve greater control over its own security and 
destiny while concurrently serving mutual regional and global interests. This 
will require further changes in command structures, procedures for contingency 
planning, and force posture. The Combined Forces Command will need to be 
replaced by a new mechanism to coordinate U.S. and ROK military operations.
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A sustainable long-term U.S. posture in the ROK should be suffi cient to assure 
Seoul of the mutual defense commitment, fi ll critical gaps in ROK capabilities, 
allow for rapid augmentation to repulse any aggressor, and provide the United 
States with a reliable foothold to support global defense operations. The U.S. 
contribution to defense of the ROK will shift from a heavy ground presence 
to reinforcements and fi repower provided by air and naval forces. With regard 
to off-peninsula operations, given the ROK’s desire to avoid any provocation 
of China, Seoul seems likely to want further clarifi cation of the circumstances 
in which U.S. forces might act, as well as advance notifi cation of unilateral 
operations by U.S. forces in Korea.
The alliance and regional security. Given China’s growing infl uence on the 
Korean peninsula and in the region and South Korea’s commitment to good 
relations with Beijing, special efforts should be made to demonstrate how the 
alliance can support regional security cooperation. If Washington and Seoul fail 
to demonstrate how the alliance can serve this function, there is a danger that 
interest will grow in new, unproven structures for regional security cooperation 
to replace the alliance. Beijing continues to suggest that the U.S.-ROK alliance 
is an unnecessary anachronism in light of China’s peaceful rise and efforts to 
bring peace to the peninsula. The Chinese have also advanced various ideas for 
a regional security architecture that would exclude the United States. Turning 
the six-party framework into a permanent regional security forum, which both 
governments agree could be pursued once the six-party talks realize their 
primary mission, merits further examination by the analytic community. In the 
interim, revival of the U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 
Group, which focused on North Korea policy, might be a useful mechanism 
to enhance trilateral cooperation on a broader range of issues (Schoff 2005). 
Much as NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program engaged Russia and other 
former Warsaw Pact countries in humanitarian and peacekeeping activities to 
build confi dence in NATO’s peaceful intent, trilateral participation in future 
humanitarian or peace support operations along with China and other Asian 
countries would perhaps be a way to demonstrate that both alliance relationships 
can contribute to regional security.
Diplomacy and public affairs. U.S. offi cials and the U.S. media need to be 
sensitive to political and social change in South Korea and to the mounting 
frustration with Korean dependency on the United States. There is a tendency 
in Washington to exaggerate the extent of genuine anti-U.S. sentiment in South 
Korea. U.S. public diplomacy needs to be more skillful in making the case for 
a transformed alliance, particularly with younger people in Korea. At the same 
time, the ROK government needs to be more outspoken in refuting irresponsible 
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attacks against the United States in the South Korean media and in public 
discourse and in explaining to its citizens how the alliance serves mutual interests. 
Enhancing the rather limited and formalized exchanges between South Korean 
legislators and their U.S. counterparts could help deepen mutual understanding 
and strengthen support in both countries for the alliance (Forrester 2007).
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